


Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan

Von Frank Ledwidge

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Von Frank Ledwidge : **Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan:

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen2 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Bittere Wahrheit...nicht nur fuer die britischen StreitkrafteVon LeotrowskiSehr lesenswertes und lesbares Buch, das detailliert die Rolle, aber auch das Selbstverstaendnis der britischen Streitkrafte im Irak- und Afghanistan-Krieg beschreibt, sowie das Scheitern der meisten militaerischen Unternehmungen in diesen Einsaetzen schildert. Dies trifft die britischen Streitkrafte sehr, da man sich ja eigentlich aus der Geschichte heraus, als Meister des Kleinkrieges und der Aufstandsbekaempfung versteht und dies auch (zum Verdruss aller, die sich mit der Gegenwart im Irak und

Afghanistan auskennen) auch ueberall lautstark kund tut. Der Autor weist nach, dass die UK-Streitkraefte viele der selbst gemachten Erfahrungen in erfolgreichen Aufstandsbehaempfung (Counter-Insurgency = COIN) eben nicht auf die Faelle Irak und Afghanistan umgesetzt haben bzw. umsetzen konnten. Man wuenscht sich, dass eine solch schonungslose Aufarbeitung der eigenen Fehler und Missverstaendnisse auch durch einen deutschen Autor fuer den deutschen Militaereinsatz in Afghanistan verfasst wird.

Kurzbeschreibung Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as best disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs. Pressestimmen ".... a devastating, highly readable critique of why Britain's armed forces have fared so badly in two of the country's most recent and controversial conflicts: Iraq and Afghanistan." (Sean Rayment, The Daily Telegraph) "... the author deserves applause for bluntly expressing the truths about our recent military failures that too many of those involved find it convenient to obscure." (Max Hastings, The Sunday Times) "... Losing Small Wars is a savage indictment of the military leadership that got British soldiers into one impossible situation after another in Iraq and Afghanistan." (Rodric Braithwaite, Financial Times) "Lieutenant Commander Frank Ledwidge, RNR (retired), has written one of the most upsetting books I have read about Britain's part in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Anyone who wants to understand what happened should read it." (Sherard Cowper-Coles, New Statesman) "Kurzbeschreibung Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as best disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.