


[Mobile book] Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win (American Century)

Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win (American Century)

Von Richard A. Gabriel

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Von Richard A. Gabriel : Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win (American Century) before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win (American Century):

Kundenrezensionen Hilfreichste Kundenrezensionen 0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Required reading for any military professional. Von CPT Taylor Cox (taylor@winternet.com) Excellent analysis of the repeated failures of US military operations from the end of the Vietnam war through the assault on Grenada. Many of

the lessons learned that are examined in detail were directly applied by the commanders in Operation Desert Storm. I was presented with a copy in 1987 at my commissioning ceremony by a Special Forces LTC. After sharing it with several peers in Army Aviation, I passed my highlighted, dog-eared copy to a friend at Pensacola where several Naval Air professionals got a chance to take a peek. I now require that my junior officers and NCOs read this book as part of their professional development.0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. the military is still totally incompetentVon ChrisThe best book written about the post-Vietnam military. Although Mr. Gabriel was an officer, he seems especially in tune with what really happens to the soldiers on the ground who have to carry out stupid orders from above. This is one of the most honest and objective looks at the U.S. military. I wish he would write a sequel, beginning with Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. A litany of failure.

KurzbeschreibungThe history of American military operations in the post-Vietnam era has been marked by failure and near-disaster. Since 1970, American forces have been committed in five operations--in Sontay to rescue prisoners, in Cambodia on behalf of the crew of the Mayaguez, in Iran to rescue the American hostages, in Beirut, and in Grenada--and in each case they have failed. Gabriel tells how and why each was crippled by faulty intelligence, clumsy execution, or poor planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Much of his information is still classified by the Pentagon and is revealed here for the first time. Finally, Gabriel offers a prescription for reform based on his twenty-one years of military experience.From Library JournalGabriel begins with a good chapter on why things go wrong in the military and then details what went wrong in five small-scale American military operations: the raid on Sontay prison in North Vietnam; the rescue of the crew of the Mayaguez in Cambodia; the Iranian hostage mission; the involvement in Beirut; and the invasion of Grenada. His thesis, as in his earlier books, is that command channels are so confused that they invite failure. He demonstrates how each of these operations was mismanaged from the top. The culprits were not the soldiers, but the officers and civilians who did the planning. Gabriel makes his points with conviction and an insider's appreciation. The journalistic writing is clear and generally factual, but a bit too emotional to have much impact in public debate. For comprehensive collections. Edward Gibson, James Madison Univ. Lib., Harrisonburg, Va.Copyright 1985 Reed Business Information, Inc.KurzbeschreibungThe history of American military operations in the post-Vietnam era has been marked by failure and near-disaster. Since 1970, American forces have been committed in five operations--in Sontay to rescue prisoners, in Cambodia on behalf of the crew of the Mayaguez, in Iran to rescue the American hostages, in Beirut, and in Grenada--and in each case they have failed. Gabriel tells how and why each was crippled by faulty intelligence, clumsy execution, or poor planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Much of his information is still classified by the Pentagon and is revealed here for the first time. Finally, Gabriel offers a prescription for reform based on his twenty-one years of military experience.