


(Mobile book) Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis (American Ways Series)

Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis (American Ways Series)

Von Mark J. White

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Von Mark J. White : Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis (American Ways Series) before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis (American Ways Series):

Kundenrezensionen Hilfreichste Kundenrezensionen 6 von 6 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Ein

Standardwerk Von Wolfgang Glatzer Zur Kubakrise sind in den letzten Jahren eine Fülle neuer Bücher erschienen. "Missiles in Cuba" von Mark J. White gehört sicherlich zu den besten Veröffentlichungen zu diesem Thema. Der anerkannte Kennedy-Fachmann White verliert sich nicht in Details sondern beschränkt sich auf das Wesentliche. Der Leser erhält so auf knapp 150 Seiten einen guten Einblick in die- die Ursache und Vorgeschichte,- die komplizierte und langwierige Beilegung,- und die Lehren der Kubakrise. Fazit: Eine ausgezeichnete, knapp gefasste Überblicksdarstellung. Gerade zum Einstieg sehr empfehlenswert. 0 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. missiles in cuba Von Ein Kunde the other missiles of october: eisenhower, kennedy, and the jupiters, 1957-1963 0 von 6 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. missiles in cuba Von Ein Kunde the other missiles of october: eisenhower, kennedy, and the jupiters, 1957-1963

Kurzbeschreibung For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White's study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. Missiles in Cuba is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White's own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington's perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam. Pressestimmen Valuable... A major work.--Richards, David "Indianapolis Star"

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