


[Free download] US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare

US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare

Von Thomas K. Adams

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Von Thomas K. Adams : US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare:

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. A bit too detailed of a summary...Von Ein KundeAlthough I think this is a good book, I thought the emphasis on logistical

descriptions was too severe. I had to struggle through portions on unit descriptions that were a myriad acronyms and battalion numbers. The anecdotal descriptions of special forces events are far better served by topic specific novels. For example, "Black Hawk Down" by M. Bowden did a much better job of setting the ferocity and importance of the events in Somalia, as well as a better description of the special forces involved, even though that was secondary to the plot. I learned more about the SEALs from reading Marcinko's non-fiction Rogue Warrior novel than I felt I digested from this book. I also thought the author was too focused on Psychological Ops., whose role as a special force, is well, boring. In sum, although a sterling account on the descriptions of the special forces units and their specific goals, the lack of real-event development, such as Stephen Ambrose makes this a hard book to finish.

Kurzbeschreibung Armies in the 1990s are commonly involved in low-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as "unconventional warfare". Thomas Adams argues for a shift in expectations with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress. Kurzbeschreibung Armies in the 1990s are commonly involved in low-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as "unconventional warfare". Thomas Adams argues for a shift in expectations with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress. Synopsis Modern armies are planned and structured to fight massive World War II-type operations involving the large-scale movements of tanks and machinery across continents. In fact they are rarely called upon to participate in such conflicts. It is far more common for them to find themselves involved in lower-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as "unconventional warfare", typified by the 1990s conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Thomas Adams argues that, for the most part, the conventional war-fighting forces of the USA are not the best military forces to deal with such situations, where there is a lack of a clearly-defined enemy and a need for persuasion, negotiation and even community leadership alongside elements who are willing to resort to deadly force. The appropriate components of the US military to deal with this, in his view, are the Special Operations Forces (SOF). He discusses the composition of the SOF and their varying roles, discussing their evolution, strengths and weaknesses, and gives a history of US involvement in non-conventional warfare from the American revolution to the 1990s. He argues that the US Department of Defense still sees military conflict in the form of conventional warfare, with its emphasis on high-technology combat. The very existence of high-technology systems, however, makes conventional warfare less likely, with the result that the US Army may become vulnerable to "low-tech" offensives, and already there has been an increase in "unconventional" conflicts since the demise of the Soviet Union. Adams proposes a change in strategic thinking together with investment in training and a usable military doctrine to guide development. A shift in expectations is required, with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress.