


(Free and download) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

Von George Tsebelis

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Von George Tsebelis : Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work:

Kundenrezensionen Hilfreichste Kundenrezensionen 8 von 8 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Bald ein politikwissenschaftliches Standardwerk Von Ein Kunde George Tsebelis hat der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft in den 1990er-Jahren durch seinen Vetospieler-Ansatz einen wesentlichen neuen Ansatz geliefert. In diesem erst 2002 erschienenen Werk fasst Tsebelis seine bisherigen Forschungen der Vetospieler-Analyse umfassend und systematisch zusammen und ergänzt diese Informationen mit seinen neuesten Forschungsergebnissen. Die Vetospieler-Analyse

basiert auf der Rational-Choice-Logik, wie in den Einführungskapiteln ausführlich erklärt wird. Tsebelis selber erhebt den Anspruch, durch die Analyse von Vetospielern in politischen Systemen einen Ansatz gefunden zu haben, der das Wirken der politischen Institutionen erklärt. Daran gibt es in der Politikwissenschaft kritische Meinungen, da er mit seinem Modell einige Formen der Entscheidungsfindung bzw. Nicht-Entscheidung, wie z.B. ausgehandelte Paketsungen, kaum erklärt. Da sich das Konzept der Vetospieleranalyse aber weiterhin in der Politikwissenschaft einer zunehmenden Beliebtheit erfreut, ist dieses Werk für jeden an vergleichender Politikwissenschaft Interessierten, insbesondere für alle Studenten der Politikwissenschaft, praktisch unverzichtbar und dank seiner guten Struktur und der umfassenden Erklärung verdient es auch fünf Sterne. Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass dieses Buch daher sich zu einem politikwissenschaftlichen Standardwerk entwickeln wird.

Kurzbeschreibung Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? *Veto Players* advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, *Veto Players* will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna **Pressestimmen** "This is a big book and an important one. It completes a program on which George Tsebelis has been working for ten years or more. With luck, it may revolutionize the systematic study of comparative government."--Iain McLean, "Journal of Legislative Studies" **Kurzbeschreibung** Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? *Veto Players* advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, *Veto Players* will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna